

WEATHER REPORT1. General:

a. This operation was planned on the 9 February on the basis of a forecast which gave good base and route conditions and visual bombing conditions at the target. This forecast was never changed and the mission was carried out on this basis.

b. Excellent weather was forecast and weather conditions on the operation were about as expected. Visual bombing was done. The only error of any importance was in the target wind forecasts which were too low.

2. Bases at Take Off: There was 5-8/10 cumulus and stratocumulus present, with scattered showers in the vicinity. Visibilities were 12 miles, dropping to 3 miles in rain showers. Ceilings were 1000-1500 feet with tops at 6000 feet. No difficulties were encountered due to weather on take-offs and assemblies.

3. Route Outgoing: To 19°N there were 8/10 cumulus with bases at 1500 feet and tops at 6-8000 feet accompanied by scattered showers activity and broken altocumulus, bases at 12,000 feet, tops at 14,000 feet. To 26°N there was 4-5/10 stratocumulus with scattered high cirrus. Visibilities were 15 miles and winds were 330°, 15 knots. There was light turbulence. To 33°N there was 8/10 stratocumulus bases 1500 feet and tops 8-10,000 feet. Scattered rainshowers in this sector cut visibilities from 15 miles to 3 miles. There was light to moderate turbulence. The 73rd Wing reported that wing formations were disrupted during climb which broke out at 4000 feet, but that reassembly was accomplished before hitting the target. From 33°N to target the cloud cover decreased rapidly.

4. Target: 4/10 stratocumulus, bases 2000 feet, tops 8000 feet, were observed in the target area, and 1-2/10 coverage was found over the target. Visibility was estimated at 30 miles. One small cloud directly over the target encountered by later groups prevented them from obtaining photographs of their bomb bursts. The wind was estimated at 270°, 140 knots as against the forecast of 260° at 128 knots.

5. Route Returning: The return route was similar to the weather on the route out.

6. Bases on Return: Saipan had 7/10 cumulus, bases 1600 feet, tops 8-10,000 feet with scattered showers in the area. Visibility was 15 miles, dropping to one mile in showers. Tinian had 8/10 stratocumulus, bases 1200 feet and lowering to 500 feet in showers. Visibility was 12 miles, lowering to one mile in showers. Light to moderate turbulence was reported and a low approach had to be made. This proved to be dangerous and one plane hit the water in a down draft. No showers fell on the runway during landing.


7. Remarks: In general the forecast for this mission was excellent and many crew members remarked about it. The only noticeable poor part was the forecast for Tinian bases on return.

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
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
10 February 1945.

FORECAST WEATHER



OBSERVED WEATHER





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Prognostic Map 0000Z 10 February 1945



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Synoptic Map 0000Z 10 February 1945.

SECRET

ANNEX

C

COMMUNICATIONS REPORTS

Part I - Radar Counter Measures

Part II - Communications Officer's Report

Mission No. 29

10 February 1945

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PART I - RADAR COUNTER MEASURES

1. GENERAL: Seven RCM Search Aircraft were scheduled to participate in this mission. Due to one abort, only six aircraft completed the mission. A diversionary attack was made on Hamamatsu in which two aircraft participated, and dropped Rope (CHR-2) 100 miles from the mainland stopping when the target (Hamamatsu) was reached. Five observers searched for enemy signals from the main formation while one observer searched from the diversionary effort.

2. RESULTS OF SEARCH:

a. Search for signals from 28 to 3000 mc was performed. A total of 33 radar signals was logged.

b. The following signals in the Ota area having gun laying characteristics were intercepted:

76/8/2200 Lobe Switching.
77/8/3000
185/5/2100

c. The complete intercept log follows:

(1) Target Area (Ota)

90/850/16 Tracking
95.5/475/19 "
103.2/1000-1500/18 "

(2) Target Area (Hamamatsu)

150/900/6-8 Tracking
185/1000/18 "
290/---/4-14 Very Weak

(3) Other radar signals intercepted:

79/500/30	Near Bayonnaise Rocks	Tracking
100/200E/10	Near Iwo Jima	Sweep rate 3 rpm
103/500/20	Near Iwo Jima	Tracking
103/1050/19	Near Iwo Jima	Tracking
104/300/25	Near Nishino Shina	Tracking
107/300/10-12	Near Iwo Jima	Sweep rate 3 rpm
109/475/20	Near Iwo Jima	Tracking
112/500/40	Near Iwo Jima	Tracking
123/475/10	Near Iwo Jima	Tracking
127/300/10	Near Iwo Jima	Sweep rate 3 rpm
139/1500E/--	Near Hachijo Jima	Weak
146/---/15	Near Bonin Islands	Sweep rate 1/2 rpm
152/1050/7	33/50N - 140/15E	Tracking
156/2000/8-10	33/ N - 139/ E	Tracking
157/500/15	Near Bayonnaise Rocks	Tracking
160/1000/8	32/20N - 139/20E	Sweep rate 2 rpm

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170/800/7.5	32/30N - 141/10E	Tracking
189/1100/12	Possible shipborne	Tracking
194/1100/12	Near Hachijo Jima	Tracking
197/1200/17	Near Nishino Shima	Sweeping
75/500/58	34/ N - 141/30E	Tracking
80/250/48-50	Near Smith Island	Tracking
92/850/15	33/50N - 141/40E	Sweeping
105/1000/18-20	Near Tori Shima	Irregular
190/800/10	Near Tori Shima	Irregular (very weak)

d. No D/Fing of the above signals was impossible due to the lack of suitable equipment. The locations listed above indicate where the signal was intercepted.

3. ANALYSIS:

a. Results of Diversion. Although at first hand it was apparent that the diversion was successful in reducing the enemy fighter attacks on the main raid (305 fighter attacks as compared with an average of 480 attacks for this area), the results were not conclusive. An intercepted enemy communication at 0604Z on a frequency of 4600 kc was translated and analyzed to determine the success of this diversion. The information contained in the recording was as follows:

(1) Ishakawa (apparently a regional fighter control station) called what is believed to be common Japanese surnames (perhaps the names of pilots) and told them to go to Nagoya. Tabulation indicates that Ishikawa sent not less than 12 airplanes to Nagoya from the vicinity of Tokyo. If those whom Ishikawa called were formation leaders, the number of planes directed might have been much greater. Why Ishikawa sent the planes to Nagoya 1½ hours after the diversion had reached their target and while Ota was being bombed is not clearly understood. With the information at hand it is impossible to draw any definite conclusions concerning the information.

b. Antiaircraft was reported as barrage type, heavy and inaccurate. Cloud coverage was 1/10 at main target. The flak was coordinated with the signals intercepted at 76 mc described in paragraph 2b.

4. EQUIPMENT: No equipment failures were noted on this mission.

5. CONCLUSIONS: The 76 and 77 mc signals intercepted with gun laying radar characteristics presumably originated from the Japanese Mark TA Model III Type enemy equipment.

a. The lobe switched signals in the 150 mc band have been recorded in many cases. The use of this signal is not known since it has not been thus far definitely associated with enemy flak or fighters. A close watch is being kept of this band on all missions.

b. The total number of signals intercepted were between 76 and 290 mc indicating a large amount of enemy electronic equipment has been concentrated within this spectrum.

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c. The signal 290/---/4-14 is the only intercept above 200 mc on this mission. While it may be a spurious response, no other signal intercepts in the same area were heard which could give rise to a spurious signal on this frequency. Six signals between 200 and 400 mc were intercepted on the 4 February mission to the Kobe-Osaka area, and it appears that new types of radar are coming into widespread use.

PART II - COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Strike Reports: Aircraft radio operators transmitted seventeen (17) Strike Reports (Bombs Away): All were received by the Ground Station.

2. Fox Transmissions: Weather encoded in UCOPAC and Time Ticks were transmitted simultaneously on all strike frequencies on the half hour and the hour, respectively. No requests for weather or for time ticks were made by aircraft in flight.

3. Frequencies: All strike frequencies were jammed or interfered with at different periods during this mission. Jamming over the target on 11080 kos made reception difficult. Several strike reports were received only after two and three attempts. In a percentage breakdown of traffic carried out during the mission, thirty-nine per cent was carried out on 6 m.c. frequencies; thirty-eight per cent on 3 m.c. frequencies and twenty three per cent on 11 m.c. frequencies.

4. Navigational Aids: 73rd Wing aircraft radio operators requested thirty-three HF/DF bearings from Wing ground station; thirty-two of these were obtained. D/F station could not obtain bearing for one request because of heavy CW interference. 313th Wing radio operators requested thirty-two H/F D/F bearings from Wing ground station. Twenty six bearings were obtained. Four bearings were not obtained because of interference; two requests were not obtained because ground station was handling a distressed aircraft. Bearings for these six requests were obtained during another period. Saipan Radio Range and Homer were utilized by all aircraft on the return leg of the mission. Those aircraft using the OWI Radio Station Saipan, reported good results from five hundred miles out from base. Aircraft requested five VHF D/F bearings from Condor Base; all were obtained.

5. Net Discipline and Security: Generally speaking, aircraft radio operators maintained good radio discipline for this mission. Two occasions where aircraft radio operators interfered with another radio operator's transmissions were noted by the Wing ground stations. A considerable amount of unnecessary chatter is still being recorded on VHF. Speed and altitude were spoken in clear on VHF near the target. One radio operator transmitted a message consisting of clear text and code groups.

6. Enemy Transmissions: The following incidents of interference and jamming were noted during this mission:

a. 3145 kos

(1) Jap voice, effective to ineffective, at 0910Z approximately six hundred miles from base.

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b. 6055 kcs

- (1) CW, deliberate and effective at 0300Z approximately six hundred miles from base.
- (2) From 0900Z to 1200Z, intentional CW jamming blocked all traffic during this period. A bearing of three hundred forty-seven degrees was taken on this station.

c. 11080 kcs

- (1) Intentional CW jamming during transmission of all Bombs Away reports. Effective in some instances.
- (2) Heavy CW interference from unknown stations on return leg of mission.

d. 3410 kcs

- (1) At 1100Z continuous transmission of "NAP" followed by five dots.

e. 7310 kcs

- (1) Negligible

f. 11160 kcs

- (1) Negligible

7. Distress: Six requests were made for urgent HF/DF bearings; all were obtained. One aircraft sent three distress messages using reference point code. Later, this aircraft notified Ground Station that it was out of immediate danger and was able to make base. Ground Station received one SOS from an aircraft about to ditch; position and bearing were obtained by the ground station.

8. Equipment Malfunctions: AN/ART-13, three antennas broken, one dynamotor inoperative; BC-348, one inoperative; AN/ARN-7, two excessive hunting of indicator needle, one indicator inoperative, four sense antennas broken; SCR-522, three inoperative, one weak; RC-36, two inoperative, two mike buttons sticking, one intermittent in all positions, one intermittent in one position; RL-42, one inoperative, two would not reel in, two stuck.

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ANNEX

D

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Part I - Enemy Fighter Reaction Report

Part II - Flak Officer's Report

Part III - Damage Assessment Report

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Mission No. 29

10 February 1945

S E C R E T

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

PART I ENEMY FIGHTER REACTION REPORT

1. General: Enemy air opposition was moderate to strong, 230 enemy aircraft making 330 attacks. One B-29 (1% of our effort) was destroyed and 22 B-29's (21.8%) were damaged by enemy fighters. B-29s destroyed 21, probably destroyed 15, and damaged 25 enemy aircraft.

2. Sightings and Attacks:

a. Ratio of attacks to sightings for last four missions in Tokyo area:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>E/A Attacks</u>	<u>E/A Sighted</u>	<u>Ratio of Attacks to Sightings</u>
THIS MISSION	330	230	1.4 to 1
Mission #24	984	275	3.6 to 1
Mission #18	200	150	1.3 to 1
Mission #16	272	140	1.9 to 1

b. Ratio of enemy aircraft sighted to number of B-29's over Japan:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>E/A Sightings</u>	<u>No. B-29's Over Japan</u>	<u>Ratio of Sightings to Strength of our Force</u>
THIS MISSION	230	101	2.3 to 1
Mission # 24	275	63	4.4 to 1
Mission # 18	150	54	2.8 to 1
Mission # 16	140	52	2.7 to 1

c. Ratio of enemy aircraft attacking to number of B-29's over Japan:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>E/A Attacks</u>	<u>No. B-29's Over Japan</u>	<u>Ratio of Attacks to Strength of our Force</u>
THIS MISSION	330	101	3.3 to 1
Mission # 24	984	63	15.6 to 1
Mission # 18	200	54	3.7 to 1
Mission # 16	272	52	5.2 to 1

3. Location of Attacks:

a. Eighty-five percent of all attacks were prior to bombs away, as compared with 49%, 13%, and 30%, respectively, on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area.

b. Following table shows areas where the attacks occurred:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Attacks</u>	<u>Percent of Total Attacks</u>
Before reaching Landfall	1*	0
After Landfall to Initial Point	29	9
After Initial Point to Bombs Away	251	76
After Bombs Away to Coast	42	13
After Coast to 40 miles out to Sea	7	2
TOTAL	330	100

* About 5 miles off the Jap coast.

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4. Type of Enemy Aircraft Attacking: Tony made 32% of all attacks, which is practically the same as on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area. Following is the breakdown of all attacks by enemy aircraft type:

<u>E/A Type</u>	<u>No. of Attacks</u>	<u>Percent of all Attacks</u>
Tony	104	32
Tojo	74	22
Zeke	34	10
Oscar	34	10
Nick	19	6
Irving	17	5
U/I S/E's	15	5
Jack	11	3
U/I T/E's	11	3
Hamp	3	1
Val	3	1
Frank	2)	
Rex	1)	2
Rufe	1)	
Jake	1)	
TOTAL	<u>330</u>	<u>100</u>

5. Direction of Attacks

a. Nose attacks totaled 50% of all attacks, which is above average. Attacks on the right quarter were 12% of the total which is the lowest for any mission except Mission No. 12 flown 13 Dec. 1944.

6. Level of Attack:

a. Thirty-nine percent of attacks came from above, twenty-seven percent from level and thirty-four percent from below.

b. Of the high attacks, the nose attacks were five times as great as those of any other high quarter.

c. Of the level attacks, nose and left quarter attacks predominated.


d. Of the low attacks, nose and tail attacks were most numerous.

7. Direction and Level of Attack:

a. An average of one out of every four attacks was a high nose attack. Other favorite approaches were low nose, low tail, level nose and level left quarter.

b. The following chart shows the percentage distribution of direction and level of all attacks:

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8. Enemy Tactics:

a. Pacing: The fourth group to make landfall encountered several enemy fighters prior to Initial Point, none of which attacked. These unidentified fighters appeared to be pacing and acting as observers.

b. Coordinated Attacks: A total of nine attacks were coordinated, 2.7% of all attacks. Following are the reports of 7 of the 9 coordinated attacks:

(1) Over target, altitude 28,000 feet, three Tonys came in from, (a) below at 11 o'clock, (b) level at 12, and, (c) above at 2 o'clock. These A/C opened fire at approximately 1000 yards and pressed the attack to 300 yards, breaking low and under our formations.

(2) Over target at 28,000 feet, a Tojo and a Zeke came in at 9 o'clock level, opened fire at 1000 yards and pressed within 25 and 200 yards, respectively, breaking away low and out at 6 o'clock in a dive.

(3) Between initial point and the target at 29,500 feet, two Tonys came in on a pursuit curve at 11 o'clock, in trail, from high altitude and dove under our aircraft. Our gunfire was effective against one of the fighters, causing destruction of its wing.

(4) In the same area as above, two Tonys came in from high on a pursuit curve in formation. Our gunner's fire at 1000 yards apparently caused them to break away at 500 yards in a shallow dive.

(5) One enemy aircraft making a pass from one side and two or three immediately attacking high out of the sun on the other side.

(6) Three unidentified, single in-line engine enemy aircraft with diamond shaped wings made coordinated high, low attack at 12 o'clock, breaking away close with slow roll turning bellies to our fire which seemed to have no noticeable effect.

(7) Four Tonys attacked from the left, the two leaders circling around to attack our right wing and the other two attacking our left wing.

c. Ramming or New Type Attacks: None reported

d. Breakaways: Type of breakaways reported: dives, banks, splits, and left and right turns.

9. Types Enemy Aircraft Sighted but not Attacking:

a. Several Tonys, Oscars, Tojos and Irvings were sighted which did not attack.

b. One twin-boom, twin-engine, twin-tail enemy aircraft was sighted between Initial Point and target.

c. One Betty seen in same area on a parallel course driven off by a burst.

d. "Silver P-47 type, larger than Tojo. Bubble canopy. Plane moved slowly." Possibly George. Did not attack our aircraft.

e. "A plane that looked like an AT-6." Also, possible George.

10. Type and Accuracy of Enemy Fire and Type Projectile:

a. 21.8% of B-29's over Japan were damaged by enemy aircraft, as compared with 46.0%, 9.5% and 17.3% of B-29's damaged by enemy aircraft on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area.

b. One percent of B-29's over Japan were destroyed by enemy aircraft as compared with 7.9%, 3.7% and 1.9% destroyed by enemy aircraft on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area.

c. Total of 22.8% of B-29's over Japan were damaged and/or destroyed by enemy aircraft, as compared with 53.9%, 13.2% and 19.2% of B-29's damaged and/or destroyed on the three previous missions over the Tokyo area.

d. Accuracy of enemy fire was considered poor generally, although one group reported it to be the most accurate to date.

e. Reports indicate that the enemy fired 7.7- and 12.7-mm machine gun chiefly, and some 20-mm cannon.

f. One Nick was reported as having a top turret.

g. One: Jack with three machine guns widely spaced in each wing.

h. One Irving was reported as firing four wing guns plus two nose guns. The calibre was not observed.

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i. Heavy machine gun fire was reported from four Tojos.

j. One twin-engine, in-line enemy aircraft was reported to have four guns in each wing; the calibre comparable to our 50 calibre(probably 12.7)

11. B-29 Diversionary Raid Against Enemy Aircraft: Two B-29's dispensed rope and bombed Hamamatsu 43 minutes before our first combat group made Landfall. These two aircraft reported being trailed from shortly before Landfall. Although fifteen enemy fighters were encountered (Tojos, Tonys, Nicks and Irvings), none initiated any attacks.

12. Enemy Aircraft Markings: Most of the aircraft seen were O.D color with roundels on wings and fuselage. Other markings observed:

- 7 Tojo - Silver
- 2 Tojo - Dark brown and olive drab
- 9 Tojo - Black
- 1 Tojo - Olive drab and purple
- 1 Tojo - Silver with red roundels and three large stripes between cockpit and tail
- 2 Tojo - Dark green
- 1 Tojo - Black fuselage and red cowling
- 1 Tojo - Silver with red cowling and vertical fin
- 1 Tojo - Silver with orange insignia
- 1 Tojo - Black cowling
- 1 Tojo - Yellow belly
- 2 Tony - Silver
- 4 Tony - Olive drab with red roundels and orange belly
- 12 Tony - Silver with red roundels
- 3 Tony - Brown
- 6 Tony - Black
- 1 Tony - Dark blue
- 1 Tony - Yellow stripes
- 4 Jack - Silver
- 1 Jack - Brown and purple
- 1 Jack - Black with wide red band behind cockpit
- 1 Hamp - Blue and white stripes on wings
- Zekes Two white bands circling wings parallel to fuselage
- Zekes Two yellow bars on each side of roundel and red stripes on wing
- Zekes All silver
- 1 Frank- All silver

13. Claims by Type Enemy Aircraft and by Gun Position:

<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Gun Position</u>
1 Tojo			TG, LG
1 Tojo			RSG
1 Tojo			Bomb.
2 Tojo			TG
2 Tojo			RG
1 Tony			LG
2 Tony			Bomb.
1 Tony			RSG
2 Tony			RG
1 Oscar			TG
1 Oscar			RG, TG
1 Nick			RSG, Bomb.
1 Hamp			Unknown (A/C lost)
1 Rufe			Bomb.
1 Rex			RSG, LG
1 Zeke			Bomb.
1 Zeke			TG
TOTAL	21	1 Tojo	RSG

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 By mld NARA Date 5/16/11

S E C R E T

<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probably Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Gun Position</u>
	3 Tony		Bomb.
	1 Tony		RG
	1 Oscar		RSG
	1 Zeke		RG, LG
	1 Zeke		TG, RSG, Bomb.
	2 Zeke		RG, TG
	2 Zeke		RG
	1 Zeke		TG
	1 Jack		LG, Bomb.
	1 Jack		Bomb.
TOTAL	15		
		2 Tojo	Bomb
		1 Tojo	RG
		2 Tojo	RSG
		1 Tojo	RG, TG
		2 Tony	LG
		2 Tony	RSG
		1 Tony	Bomb,
		1 Tony	RG
		1 Tony	TG, RG
		1 Oscar	TG
		1 Nick	TG
		1 Nick	RSG
		1 Nick	Bomb. RG
		1 Zeke	LG
		1 Zeke 32	RG
		2 Irving	TG
		1 Irving	RSG
		1 Jack	Bomb.
		1 U/I T/E	Bomb.
		1 U/I T/E	TG
		TOTAL	25

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PART II - FLAK OFFICER'S REPORT

A. Enemy Antiaircraft Fire:

1. Heavy AA was first encountered at landfall near Tateyama. Antiaircraft fire was meager and inaccurate. Bursts were level to low, leading to trailing, and to the left. Majority of fire was continuously pointed.
2. At the I.P. and in the target area AA was meager to moderate, and inaccurate to accurate. Bursts were level to low, leading to trailing, and left to right. All three types of fire control were used.
3. One A/C bombed Iwo Jima at 19,500 ft. AA was meager to moderate and inaccurate to accurate. Bursts were mostly low and trailing. One burst rocked A/C. White streamers went up vertically from one of the bursts.
4. Two A/C observed AA over HaHa Jima for about 30 seconds. It was meager to moderate, and inaccurate. Bursts were generally leading.
5. Of the 55 A/C over the primary target, 3 were damaged by flak.
6. The 313th Wing participated with the 504th and the 505th Groups, 29 A/C bombing the primary targets and 2 A/C bombing last resort and targets of opportunity.
7. The formations flew at 26,500 - 27,000 feet, and the primary target was bombed at 0630 - 0641Z, using the axis of attack 270° - 280°.
8. The 505th Group first encountered flak at Koga. AA was meager and generally inaccurate. Bursts were leading and low. The AA seemed to be continuously pointed. One A/C suffered flak damage.
9. Over the target flak was meager, inaccurate to accurate. The majority of the bursts were leading (a few trailing), bursting high, level, and low. The bursts were generally in line with the A/C and the fire was continuously pointed.
10. In the vicinity of Mito (36°22'N - 140°28'E) at 26,000 ft, meager, inaccurate flak was reported. The fire was continuously pointed, and the bursts were again leading, low and in line with the A/C.
11. The 504th Group detoured Koga area. Near Chofu airfield and also near Konike airfield a few inaccurate bursts were observed.
12. Flak over the target area and over Ota was meager to moderate and generally inaccurate. Few bursts within formation caused minor damage. The majority of the bursts were low.

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13. On withdrawal this group encountered intermittent AA fire all the way to the coast.

14. Of the 29 A/C bombing the primary target, 5 A/C of the 313th Wing were damaged by flak.

15. The wind at the bombing altitude over the primary target was reported by various formations as from 253° - 280° at 135 - 164 knots, and the undercast varied from 2/10 - 6/10.

B. Our Tactics vs. AA:

1. One group of the 73rd Wing made a slight turn after bombs away and lost altitude. Three other groups of the 73rd Wing took no evasive action.

2. The 313th Wing used loss of altitude prior to bombs away, and loss of altitude and changes in course subsequently.

C. Air to Air Bombing and Rockets:

1. The 313th Wing observed none.

2. The 73rd Wing reports as follows:

a. At a point mid-way between the IP and the coast, and north of Chosi Point, an Oscar was encountered at 28,000 ft. It was observed to drop a projectile believed to be a phosphorous bomb from a 1000-foot height above our A/C. The burst was approximately 15 feet in diameter, and about 100 feet above and 500 ft to the right of our A/C. It spread in umbrella fashion with long white streamers.

b. A possible rocket attack was reported as follows: Over the target area, at 29,000 feet, an unidentified T/E A/C flew parallel to our formation at 3 o'clock, level to slightly above, at a distance of 2000 yards. The E/A moved into the formation and released a projectile described as a "ball of fire". This projectile was accurate in deflection, but passed over the formation by at least 200 yards. It was not seen to explode and caused no observed damage.

D. Remarks: The 313th Wing reported that just prior to the collision of A/C No. 784 and A/C No. 815, a white burst or puff of smoke was observed immediately below A/C No. 784. Over the target the A/C lost altitude prior to bombs away and subsequently another loss of altitude and change of course was made.

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S E C R E T

PART III - DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT

Mission No: 3FR5M 45 Target Area: Takasaki
Date Flown: 12 February 1945 Airplane Commander: R.E.Hickethier
1st Lt, A.C.
Altitude: 33,000'

Reference photography:

- a. 3FR4M 4 - 6R:55
- b. 3FR5M 40 - 4R:51-53;4L:55
- c. 3FR5M 45 - 2:50, 51, 52

SUMMARY

This report assesses damage to Target 1544 (Nakajima Aircraft Co, New Ota Plant) inflicted by XXI Bomber Command Mission 29, 10 February 1945.

Post strike photography shows severe damage or destruction to 755,900 sq. ft. of roof area, representing about 33.5% of the total building area.

The major portion of damage was confined to the east half of the plant. It is possible that the remaining part may be still operational, or could be made operational in a relatively short time.

TARGET 1544 (36/18 N--139/23 E)

Note: The following mentioned numbered buildings are keyed to the attached plan drawing.

- Building No. 3: 8,000 sq ft (10%) gutted. Ref b shows roof removed (81,000 sq ft) from N half of building with structural members still standing. Post strike photos show no such supports remaining, suggesting that the structural members in this part of the building were of wood and have been burned down.
- Building No. 3A: 48,500 sq ft (60%) gutted. (81,000 sq ft)
- Building No. 3B: 26,600 sq ft (33%) gutted. (81,000 sq ft)
- Building No. 4: 3,800 sq ft (4.7%) roof damage. (81,000 sq ft)

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S E C R E T

Building No. 5: 80,000 sq ft (53%) destroyed
 (150,000 sq ft) 29,000 sq ft (19%) gutted
 15,000 sq ft (10%) roof damage
 124,000 sq ft (82%) total Damage

Building No. 6: 144,000 sq ft (96%) gutted
 (150,000 sq ft)

Building No. 6A: 16,600 sq ft (11%) destroyed
 (150,000 sq ft) 41,500 sq ft (28%) gutted
 58,100 sq ft (39%) total damage

Building No. 7: 7,600 sq ft (8.5%) gutted and roof damage
 (90,000 sq ft)

Building No. 7B: 12,800 sq ft (100%) gutted. It is possible that
 (12,800 sq ft) roof was removed prior to strike attack.

Building No. 11: 4,500 sq ft (5.5%) gutted. Note: Original area
 (82,000 sq ft) of building was 168,000 sq ft, but 86,000 sq ft
 of roof was removed previous to strike (ref b).

Building No. 11A: 100,000 sq ft (55%) destroyed
 (180,000 sq ft) 32,000 sq ft (18%) gutted
 132,000 sq ft (73%) total damage

Building No. 12: 12,000 sq ft (67%) destroyed
 (18,000 sq ft)

Building No. 12A: 12,000 sq ft (100%) destroyed
 (12,000 sq ft)

Building No. 12B: 10,000 sq ft (100%) destroyed
 (10,000 sq ft)

Building No. 12C: 5,500 sq ft (51%) destroyed
 (10,800 sq ft)

Building No. 13: 2,300 sq ft (100%) gutted
 (2,300 sq ft)

Building No. 13A: 2,300 sq ft (100%) gutted
 (2,300 sq ft)

Building No. 14: 76,400 sq ft (91%) gutted
 (84,000 sq ft) 7,600 sq ft (9%) roof damage
 84,000 sq ft (100%) total damage

Building No. 17: 60,000 sq ft (34%) gutted
 (179,000 sq ft)

Building No. 17A: 2,500 sq ft (1.4%) gutted
 (179,000 sq ft)

Resumo of damage:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Square Feet</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Roof area destroyed	236,100	10.4

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SECRET

Type	Square Foot	Percent
Roof area gutted	493,400	21.8
Roof area damaged	<u>26,100</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Total damage to roof area	755,900	35.5

NOTE: Total roof area of original plant was 2,262,000 sq ft.

Print 2x50 annotated and attached.

One plan drawing attached.

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Authority 48CFR 1.57
By and on the Date 8/1/94


REVISION BY 29

10 FEBRUARY 1949

NEW OTA PLANT
YAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT COMPANY

TOTAL AIRCRAFT DROPPED PRIMARY-34

SECRET
STRIKE PHOTO



STRIKE ATTACK REPORT NO. 1
C.I.U. XXI BOM. COM.

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By: md NARA Date: 5/16/11

MISSION NO 29

10 FEBRUARY 1945

NEW OTA PLANT
NAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT COMPANY

TOTAL AIRCRAFT DROPPING ON PRIMARY-84

VISUAL BOMBING		RADAR BOMBING	
AIRCRAFT SIGHTING FOR		A/C DROPPING ON LEAD A/C	A/C BOMBING BY RADAR
K and D	RANGE		
9	5	70	NONE

Confidential



Damage Assessment 12 Feb. 45

- Destroyed
- Gutted
- Roof Damage
- Roof Removed Prior to Strike
- Bldg. Removed Prior to Strike

AAF Target No. 1544
Nakajima Aircraft Co., New Ota Plant - Ota

