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Tactical Mission REPORT

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C.G., Twentieth Air Force

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(Date) (Initials)



MISSION NO. 29

FLOWN 10 FEB 1945

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HEADQUARTERS
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
ADO 234

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APO 234

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

Field Orders No. 28

Mission No. 29

Target: Nakajima Aircraft Factory

OTA, JAPAN

10 February 1945

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Prepared By:

A-2 Section

XXI Bomber Command

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HEADQUARTERS
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
APO 234

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 10 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Field Order No. 28, Headquarters XXI Bomber Command, dated 6 February 1945, directed the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings to participate in an attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Factory at Ota.

b. Targets Specified:

(1) Primary Target: Nakajima Aircraft Factory at Ota:AAF Objective folder 90.13, target 1544. (Refer to XXI Bomber Command Litho-mosaic, exhibit 1, hereto.)

(2) Secondary Target: Port and urban areas of Tokyo: AAF Objective folder 90.17.

(3) Last Resort Target: Any industrial city in Japan.

2. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Selection of D-Day: The weather forecast presented to the Commanding General on 9 February predicted good visual bombing conditions at the target and good base and route conditions. Firm decision was made to attack the Nakajima Aircraft Factory on 10 February.

b. Importance of Target:

(1) Nakajima Aircraft Factory at Ota is one of the key units in the complex system of factories operated by Nakajima, the oldest privately owned aircraft company in Japan and one of the two leading producers of aircraft and engines for the Army and Navy. The Ota plant is Nakajima's main producer of army planes, manufactures some components and sub-assemblies, and repairs aircraft.

(2) It is believed that the following planes are assembled at the Ota Plant: two-engine medium-bomber Helen (Mark 3); single-engine fighter Tojo (Mark 2), and single-engine fighter Oscar (Mark 2). The following may be produced there: single engine fighter Frank, and a two-engine medium-bomber K182 (no code name), thought to be designed to replace the aircraft Helen.

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c. Details of Planning--Operational:(1) Bombing Plans:(a) Determination of Bomb Load:

(1) The Ota plant presents a compact, nearly square target, with a majority of the buildings being modern in construction. The administration and inspection buildings are of reinforced concrete with peaked roofs. Less than 20 per cent of the roof area is believed susceptible to incendiary attack. This type of target necessitated concentration upon a bomb load that would cause the greatest damage. The 500-pound general-purpose bomb, HE type, the best available for building demolition, was recommended since it was of sufficient size to damage effectively installations of this type. The load selected was a mixture of 80 per cent 500-pound GP and 20 per cent M-76 incendiary bombs. This ratio was planned so that if hits were scored fires would spread and greater damage would result.

(2) The general-purpose bombs were fused with an instantaneous tail and a 0.1 delay nose for detonation in the event that the tail fuse failed to function. The instantaneous setting for the tail fuse would cause detonation of the bombs before they penetrated building floors. Maximum blast effect to near misses would be assured. Furthermore, if tail fuses were activated by building roofs, air bursts would result.

(3) The M-76 incendiary bomb had instantaneous nose and tail fusing in order to spread the fire as quickly as possible.

(4) Minimum intervalometer settings were used to increase the density of bombs.

(b) Bombardier's Planning:

(1) The north tip of Lake Kasumiga was selected as the initial point since it is the best visual point for this target on either an upwind or downwind run. It lies far enough from the target to give the bombardier an 18-minute bomb run. Approach was made upwind so that the lower ground speed would give the bombardier more time for accurate synchronization.

(2) The designated approach, axis of attack of 282 degrees, was used so that the formation would be on the axis of the widest part of the selected target area. The aiming point selected was between the ends of the westernmost parts-fabrications and sub-assembly building and the final assembly and fuse-lage-erection building. This point included the entire plant within a 1500-foot radius, which was within the circular error probable for this mission. Effective damage was insured if the bombs were dropped in the assigned aiming point area. The grid coordinates of the aiming point were 128133 on XXI Bomber Command Mosaic No. 90.13, target 1544.

(3) For radar bombing of the secondary target, the city of Tokyo, the geographic coordinates of 35°41'45" N-139°48'00"E were selected since these describe a point near the

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center of Incendiary Zone No. 1. This zone is approximately three miles north of the base of the "V" formed by the mouth of the Sumida River at Tokyo Bay. The land-water contrast would make a good radar check and aiming point, and this zone would be vulnerable for the combination general-purpose and incendiary bomb loads carried.

(2) Navigation Planning:

<u>Route</u>	<u>Reasons for Choice</u>
Base	
1700N - 14515E	Departure point. This point allowed the groups to join in wing formation more than 75 miles away from Iwo Jima, thereby eliminating danger of being detected by enemy radar on that island.
2900N - 13545E	
2715N - 14053E	This made use of Mishimo-Shima Island as a radar check point.
3000N - 14053E	A northerly heading was planned to prevent headwind.
3440N - 14000E	This permitted use of Nampo Shoto Islands as check points.
3542N - 14033E	Although selected course was 50 miles west of Chosi Point, it prevented a navigator from passing on the east without making landfall.
3609N - 14019E (IP)	Kasumiga Lake was the best visual and radar initial point in the region. The route was also north of Tone River, which is also easily identified. A right turn was planned after bombing.
3610N - 14100E	This was planned so that a tail wind would be available in order to leave enemy territory with the greatest possible speed.
Base	Most direct route to base was recommended.

(3) Flight Engineer's Planning:

(a) The flight plan flown was as outlined in XXI Bomber Command Regulation 55-3 for maximum fuel economy and aircraft performance.

(b) To utilize the variations in efficiency of individual aircraft and crews, it was specified that bomb loads per aircraft would be maximum consistent with safety, crew proficiency, and characteristics of individual aircraft. It was decided the minimum bomb load for aircraft of the 73rd Wing would be 6,000 pounds while that of the less-experienced 313th Wing would be 5000 pounds.

(4) Radar Planning: Although the Ota city signal can be picked up, surrounding signals are confusing, making this a difficult radar target. Because of this difficulty it was decided that if the primary target were obscured for visual bombing, a wide left turn was to be made after passing over the city. Aircraft would

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then proceed on a course of approximately 120 degrees true to Tokyo and bomb the secondary target. The exact aiming point in Tokyo was designated on enlarged scope pictures in the radar mission folder.

(5) Radar Counter Measures:

(a) It was decided to send out seven RCM search aircraft of the 73rd Wing at H-hour minus 65 minutes. A two-airplane attack was to be made on Hamamatsu to alert Tokyo defenses and feint an attack toward the Nagoya area. The two aircraft dropped rope (CHR-2 type which is effective against most Japanese early warning radar) 100 miles from the mainland, stopping when reaching the target (Hamamatsu).

(b) Routine search was to be made for enemy radar signals on frequencies between 100 mc and 3000 mc and enemy voice communications in channels between 28 mc and 100 mc. All enemy conversations were to be recorded on air-borne recorders AN/ANQ-2. The work was performed by four Radar Observers on this mission.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue Planning:

(a) The Navy was furnished with the details of the mission and requested to furnish available facilities for air-sea rescue purposes. The following surface facilities were made available:

(1) A submarine was stationed at 30° 30'N - 142° 25'E during the entire mission and another submarine was stationed at 20° 00'N - 144° 45' E from 092345Z to 101400Z.

(2) One destroyer was at 20° 00'N - 144° 45'E from 101015Z to 101400Z.

(3) Crash boats were assigned as follows: One in Magisciene Bay from 092055Z to 102230Z; one in the channel between Saipan and Tinian from 092055Z to 102230Z; and one to remain southwest of North field at Tinian from 101000Z until all aircraft had landed.

(b) This Command assigned the following:

(1) Two super Dumbo airplanes were assigned to fly over the submarine positions designated above in paragraph (a) (1).

(c) A Navy Dumbo was assigned to the following position: 23° 00'N - 145° 15'E from 100000Z to 100200Z. Another Dumbo was on ground alert at base.

d. Details of Planning--Intelligence

(1) Enemy Fighter Reaction: The report of 2 February 1945 showed a total of 480 enemy fighters in the Tokyo area. Assuming 70 per cent were operational, it was expected that 336 enemy aircraft would be available. This factor, plus past experience, indicated that recent missions had been subjected to a greater number of attacks by enemy aircraft, especially in the Tokyo area. Because of the planned altitude of the attack, 27,000 feet,

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and because the attack from enemy aircraft was not anticipated to be greater than for other similar operations, enemy fighter reaction considerations did not enter into the planning for the mission.

(2) Enemy Antiaircraft: Based on average winds for this area, 260 degrees at 108 knots, the best route of approach insofar as antiaircraft fire was concerned was on a heading between 70 and 120 degrees. However, the strength of the antiaircraft defenses, 12 heavy guns, did not warrant making enemy antiaircraft opposition a primary consideration in selecting the axis of attack.

3. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION:

a. Take-off: The first group of the 73rd Wing was scheduled to take-off at 092005Z and the first group of the 313th Wing at 092035Z. Actual take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Wing</u>	<u>Aircraft Airborne</u>	<u>First Aircraft Take-off</u>	<u>Last Aircraft Take-off</u>
73rd	83	092106Z	092154Z
313th	35	092126Z	092150Z
Totals	118	092106Z	092154Z

No assembly difficulties were experienced. Eighteen aircraft were non-effective, detailed reasons being given in Annex E, Part I, Consolidated Statistical Summary.

b. Route out: The course flown was generally as briefed. Use of several islands en route as navigational check points gave the navigators several radar wind runs before reaching the initial point. Aircraft of the 73rd Wing made landfall as briefed and went ahead on the axis of attack as briefed in a majority of cases. The 313th Wing's aircraft also made landfall as briefed, but made too wide a turn and were blown eastward to Chesi Point which, combined with a strong head wind, caused them to fly directly upwind for 45 minutes. Weather on the route out was good.

c. Over Target:

(1) Primary Target: With visibility over the target being estimated at 30 miles and with weather conditions being better than predicted, 84 of the 100 effective aircraft bombed the primary target. These aircraft bombed in 9 formations, with 70 dropping their bombs on the 9 leaders and 5 making individual range sightings. Clouds encountered were 4/10 stratocumulus between 2000 and 8000 feet, with 1/10 to 2/10 coverage over the target. A total of 187 tons of general purpose bombs and 49.5 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped from altitudes of 26,000 to 29,400 feet from 100605Z to 100641Z. (See Annex E, Part I, Consolidated Statistical Summary, for details.) Damage assessment revealed 755,900 square feet of roof area were damaged in the target area.

(2) Diversionsary Primary Target: The two aircraft assigned to strike at Hamamatsu dropped four tons of incendiary bombs at 100433Z from 30,000 to 30,050 feet, with the lead aircraft sighting the target and the other aircraft dropping on the leader.

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(3) Secondary Target: No aircraft bombed the secondary target.

(4) Last Resort Target: Three B-29's bombed the city of Ghosi and aircraft installations in the city, dropping 6.7 tons of general purpose bombs and 2.3 tons of incendiary bombs. (For details see Annex E, Part I, Consolidated Statistical Summary.)

(5) Targets of Opportunity: Eleven B-29's dropped 25.8 tons of general purpose bombs and 7 tons of incendiary bombs on the following targets of opportunity in the following manner:

<u>Number of Aircraft</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>BOMBS (TONS)</u>	
			<u>General Purpose</u>	<u>Incendiary</u>
2	497	Tateyama and Koga A/F	4.5	1.5
1	498	Hachijo Jima	2.5	0.8
2	499	Hachijo Jima	4.5	1.5
1	499	Pagan Island	2.3	0.7
1	500	Tateyama and Hato A/F	2.5	0.5
2	500	Iwo Jima	5.0	1.0
1	500	Pagan Island	2.5	0.5
1	505	Unidentified Peninsula	2.0	0.5

d. Route Back: After bombing, formations broke up beyond enemy fighter range and returned by the most direct route, as briefed. Weather for the return trips to bases was good. On the trip back, the longest flown to date by the two wings, seven ditchings occurred.

e. Landing:

(1) Aircraft of the main force landed at bases under good weather conditions as follows:

<u>Wings</u>	<u>First Landing</u>	<u>Last Landing</u>
73rd	101110Z	101350Z
313th	<u>101306Z</u>	<u>101424Z</u>
Total	101110Z	101424Z

(2) Losses: Losses were reported due to the following reasons:

- (a) Enemy aircraft: 1
- (b) Enemy antiaircraft: None
- (c) Accidents and Mechanical: 3. One crashed on attempted take-off and two collided in mid-air.
- (d) Ditchings: 7
- (e) Unknown: 1.

(See Annex E, Part 1, Consolidated Statistical Summary, for detailed reasons, except for ditchings, which can be found in detail in Annex A, Part VI)

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f. Operations Summary:

(1) Navigation (See Annex A, Part I, for details): Navigation on this missions was generally as briefed, with radar check points being used effectively by the crews. The program instituted to give increased turn and target training is expected to remedy some of the weaknesses displayed. As indicated, one of these errors caused the 313th Wing to make landfall as briefed and then make a turn that was too wide, causing the aircraft to be blown eastward.

(2) Bombing (See Annex A, Part II, for details): All bomb runs were made visually, although there was a slight amount of interference on some runs in the final seconds due to scattered clouds, which also prevented adequate photographic coverage. Observed results were good. Mechanical difficulties encountered were chiefly in the A-2 type bomb release. In addition, personnel errors caused a number of bombs to fall short of the target.

(3) Flight Engineering (See Annex A, Part III, for details): Unfavorable surface winds caused both wings to take 20 to 25 minutes longer than predicted to reach the point of climb, using an average of 130 additional gallons of fuel per aircraft. Unpredicted altitude winds caused the 73rd Wing to remain 20 minutes longer at altitude than planned at an average cost of approximately 250 gallons of gasoline per aircraft. Unpredicted winds at altitude, an attempt to avoid anti-aircraft concentration, and drifting off course caused the 313th Wing to remain 40 minutes longer at altitude than planned and cost 500 gallons of fuel per aircraft.

(4) Radar (See Annex A, Part IV, for details): Normal employment was made of SCR-718 radio altimeter and SCR-695 IFF equipment. Fixes were taken at an average range of 750 miles.

(5) Gunnery (See Annex A, Part V, for details): Both Wings displayed high proficiency in equipment and gun operation. Enemy aircraft made attacks on loose formations. More effective use was made of the central fire control system.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue (See Annex A, Part VI, for details): Seven B-29's ditched, with 30 survivors being picked up from three aircraft. Negative results were obtained in the other four searches.

g. Weather (See Annex B, Part I, for details): Excellent weather was forecast and weather conditions on the operations were about as predicted. The forecast of winds at target was low. The target area had 4/10 stratocumulus and coverage over the target was 1/10 to 2/10. Winds were 270 degrees at 140 knots. Weather conditions at bases were good for both take-off and landing.

h. Communications:

(1) Radar Counter Measures (See Annex C, Part I for details): Six RCM search aircraft flew the mission, with five searching for enemy signals from the main formations and one searched from the diversionary attack made on Hamana'su. A total of 33 radar signals was logged. Results of the diversion were noticed and enemy signals for gun-laying radar were intercepted. There were no equipment failures.

(2) Communications (See Annex C, Part II for details): All strike frequencies were jammed or interfered with at different periods during the mission. Radio discipline was good, although there was some unnecessary talk. Seventeen strike reports were transmitted to the ground station.

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i. Intelligence Summary:

(1) Enemy Air Opposition (See Annex D, Part I, for details): Enemy air opposition was moderate to strong, with 230 enemy aircraft making 330 attacks, a lower average than on recent major strikes. One B-29, 1 per cent, was destroyed and 21.8 per cent damaged by Japanese fighters. Eighty-five per cent of all attacks was made prior to bombs away, a high mark for Japanese air defense. Tony again made the most attacks on our aircraft, 32 per cent. Nose attacks totaled 50 percent of all attacks made and high attacks were favored in 39 per cent of the cases. A total of nine coordinated attacks was observed. Some new types of unidentified aircraft were encountered over the primary target. The diversionary raid reported that 15 enemy aircraft of all types were encountered, but no attacks were made. The B-29's destroyed 21 enemy aircraft; 15 were probably destroyed; and 25 were damaged.

(2) Enemy Anti-Aircraft (See Annex D, Part II for details): There were no losses to anti-aircraft. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was reported weak and inaccurate from initial point to target area, and also the same in the target area. Once again one of our aircraft reported seeing what was believed to be a phosphorous bomb. It spread in umbrella-like fashion, with long white streamers. Over the target area at 29,000 feet an enemy aircraft released a projectile described as a "ball of fire". It was not seen to explode, passing about 200 yards over the formation.

(3) Bombing Results and Damage Assessment (See Annex D, Part III, for details): Interpretation of photographs obtained on 12 February 1945 assessed visible damage to 755,900 square feet of roof area, representing 33.5 per cent of the total building area. A major portion of damage was confined to the east half of the plant. It was reported possible that the remaining part may be still operational, or could be made operational in a relatively short time.

Curtis E. Lemay
CURTIS E. LEMAY

Major General, U.S.A.

Commanding

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TARGET 1544
NAKAJIMA PLANT
OTA

⊗ AIMING POINT

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ANNEX

A

OPERATIONS REPORTS

Exhibit - Track Charts

Part I - Navigator's Report

Part II - Bombardier's Report

Part III - Flight Engineer's Report

Part IV - Radar Officer's Report

Part V - Gunnery Officer's Report

Part VI - Air-Sea Rescue Report

Exhibit - Air-Sea Rescue Report

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
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MISSION NO. 29
 DATE 10 FEB. 1945
 WING 73 rd
 GROUP _____

— BRIEFED
 - - - 497
 - - - 498
 - - - 499
 x x x x x x x 500



ASSEMBLY
 497-100246 Z
 498-100229 Z
 499-100243 Z
 500-100247 Z

Routes OUT and BACK
 AS BRIEFED

	TAKE OFF		LANDING	
	FIRST	LAST	FIRST	LAST
497	092149 Z	092154 Z	101154 Z	101327 Z
498	092106 Z	092119 Z	101231 Z	101350 Z
499	092121 Z	092134 Z	101101 Z	101313 Z
500	092135 Z	092147 Z	101132 Z	101337 Z

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
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140°

——— BRIEFED
 - - - 497
 - - - 498
 - - - 499
 XXXXXX 500

MISSION NO. 29
 DATE 10 FEB. 1945
 WING 313th
 GROUP _____

— BRIEFED
 - - - 505
 - - - 504



505-100257 Z
 504-100242 Z

505-100201 Z
 504-100146 Z

505-092242 Z
 504-092243 Z

	T.O.		LANDING	
	First	Last	First	Last
505	092126Z	092135Z	101306Z	101345Z
504	092138Z	092150Z	101315Z	101424Z

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TARGET
 505 - 100630 Z
 504 - 100641 Z

IP 505-100550 Z
 504-100600 Z

505-100648 Z

504-100700 Z

504-100536 Z

505 - 100521 Z

35°

MISSION NO. 29
 DATE 10 FEB. 1945
 WING 313 th
 GROUP _____

———— BRIEFED
 - - - - 505
 ······ 504

140°

COMPILED BY 35TH PHOTO TECH UNIT

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OPERATIONS REPORTSPART I - NAVIGATOR'S REPORT

1. Navigation to the assembly point at Nishino-Shima was generally as briefed, but the time of departure was 11 minutes late because of a delay in take-off. The climb was initiated at 30°-00' North with the first 9000 feet made in instrument conditions. Altitude was reached at 34°-00' North opposite Miyake-Jima.

2. The course was flown as briefed within 30 miles of the Nanpoto-Shoto Islands to provide navigational aid from AN/APQ-13 returns. The use of these islands and the western Tokyo peninsula gave the navigators several radar wind runs before reaching the initial point. Winds were briefed at 260° at 128 knots, and actual computation was 263° at 143 knots.

3. The 73rd Wing landfall and axis of attack were as briefed.

4. The 313th Wing made landfall as briefed, but made too wide a turn and was blown eastward to Choshi Point. This, combined with the strong head wind, gave them a total of 45 minutes directly upwind.

5. The 313th Wing requested, that future missions to this target be planned downwind, except when wind velocities are known to be excessive. However, an upwind run is preferable for the following reasons:

a. The Tone river and lakes in this region provide outstanding visual and radar check points. No good check points are available on the downwind approach.

b. Lack of anti-aircraft fire in Ota-Koizuma region gave no increased possibility of damage from upwind runs.

6. The 313th Wing complained of the inaccuracy of Loran Fixes because of the poor cut of the Guam and Ulithi Chains. Several of their fixes and ground speeds gave poor positions, but inaccuracies can be greatly reduced by proper set calibration and accurate interpretation of sky waves.

7. The average times to the target were as follows: 73rd Wing: 08:44 and 313th Wing: 09:03.

8. Average total times were: 73rd Wing: 14:04 and 313th Wing: 15:38.

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PART II - BOMBARDIER'S REPORT

1. An attempt was made to camouflage target 1545 (Koizumi) to the south of target 1544, but the smoke did not interfere with bombing the primary target. Scattered clouds interfered slightly on some bombing runs by obscuring the target during the final seconds of the run, but in all cases a visual run was made.
2. The IP and AP were easily identifiable. Results were reported visually as good; however, due to cloud coverage, no adequate photo coverage was obtained. Bombing photo results of the first squadron only was obtained. These were concentrated in the eastern half of the target area.
3. Although inadequate photo coverage was obtained it is believed from an analysis of lead crew information that formation flying was poor and personnel errors were made by Wing bombardiers. These included premature release of bombs before release was made by the lead ship, causing a number of bombs to fall short. Bombrack trouble was again encountered and, as before, most prevalent in the A-2 type release.

PART III - FLIGHT ENGINEER'S REPORT

1. Assembly and Low Altitude Cruise:
 - a. The group assemblies of the 313th and 73rd Wings were made near the base as on previous missions.
 - b. The initial cruise of the 73rd Wing at low altitude was made in individual group formations to the island of Nishino Shima where a wing assembly was made.
 - c. The initial cruise of the 313th Wing was made in group formation with no attempt of wing assembly.
 - d. Unfavorable surface winds caused both wings to take 20 to 25 minutes longer than predicted to reach the point of climb. This cost approximately 130 additional gallons of fuel per aircraft.
2. Climb to Bombing Altitude: The time required to climb to bombing altitude was as predicted for both wings.
3. High Altitude Cruise to Target:
 - a. Unpredicted winds at altitude caused the 73rd Wing to remain at altitude 20 minutes longer than anticipated, at a cost of approximately 250 gallons of fuel per aircraft.
 - b. Unpredicted winds, in addition to an attempt to avoid a flak concentration, and drifting off course when changing lead, caused the 313th Wing to remain at altitude 40 minutes longer than anticipated. It is estimated that this additional time at altitude cost approximately 500 gallons of fuel per aircraft.
4. Return to Base: Returns to base were by individual aircraft.
5. General:
 - a. This mission was the longest mission flown by the 73rd and 313th Wings to date.

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b. Unforeseen headwind conditions at low and high altitudes caused an unexpected quantity of fuel to be consumed. The average fuel remaining per aircraft was 576 gallons for both wings.

c. For detailed fuel consumption data see Consolidated Statistical Summary, Annex E.

PART IV - RADAR OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Of the 112 aircraft equipped with AN/APQ-13, ninety-one possessed sets satisfactory for bombing.

2. Winds were obtained by AN/APQ-13 on the island chains on approach to IP as planned.

3. Normal employment was made of the SCR-718 (Radar Altimeter) and SCR-695 (IFF). One SCR-695 failed due to battle damage.

4. AN/APN-4 (Loran) was normal, with fixes taken at an average range of 750 nautical miles.

PART V - GUNNERY OFFICER'S REPORT

1. The mission from a gunnery standpoint was excellent, both wings displaying high proficiency in equipment and gun operation. The upper forward and lower forward fired the greatest percentage of ammunition since the nose attack was still the favored attack by the Japanese pilots.

2. The enemy aircraft pressed attacks on loose formations and flew through these formations, but this was not the case with tight formations.

3. The gunners have gained confidence in the C.F.C system and are beginning to use it more efficiently.

4. Combat Data:

	<u>73rd Wing</u>	<u>313th Wing</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Ammo Expended	92,448 rds (85 A/C)	97,508 rds (25 A/C)	189,956 (110A/C)
CFC Equipment	100%	100%	100%
Turrets	99.4% operative	99% operative	99.2% operative
50 Cal. M.G.	97% operative	93% operative	95% operative

For details of E/A destroyed, probably destroyed and damaged, turn to Annex D, Part I, "Enemy Air Opposition".

PART VI - AIR-SEA RESCUE REPORT

Following is a summary of ditching incidents occurring on this mission. (See Air-Sea Rescue map on following page.)

1. Aircraft No. 20V757: 313th Wing -- This aircraft ditched at approximately 101315Z, with a modified position given as 23° 15'N - 144° 50' E. Eleven survivors were sighted at 102400Z at 22° 30'N -

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145° 00'E by Tinian long-range search planes. The survivors were picked up by a small seaplane tender "Bering Strait" at 110700Z.

2. Aircraft No. 37V757: 313th Wing -- Ditching was reported by Dumbo at approximately 101500Z with a position of 18° 40'N - 146° 17'E. The entire crew of twelve were rescued by the tender Bering Strait.

3. Aircraft No. 43V757: 313th Wing -- This aircraft ditched approximately 101214Z at 18° 11'N - 144° 32'E. Seven survivors were sighted 17° 50'N - 144° 10'E at 110055Z by a search plane and were picked up at 110420Z by a minesweeper.

4. Aircraft No. 6V756: 313th Wing -- Ditching occurred at 19° 10'N - 145° 20'E approximately 101100Z. Flares were reported at 19° 10'N - 145° 20'E at 102339Z with no effective survivor sightings. Searches were continued until 15 February with negative results.

5. Aircraft No. 4V757: 313th Wing -- This aircraft ditched on a bearing of 305° from Tinian approximately 101740Z, with distance unknown. Searches were initiated at 102100Z in area around 13° 50'N 143° 00'E. The search was continued until 15 February with negative results.

6. Aircraft No. 2V607: 73rd Wing -- Ditching occurred within 50 miles of 17° 00'N - 145° 00'E with an approximated ditching time of 101752Z. No further word was received on this aircraft. Searches were continued until 15 February with negative results.


7. Aircraft No. 41V607: 73rd Wing -- Ditching was reported as 16° 00'N - 145° 20'E at 101227Z. No further word was received on this aircraft and all searches proved negative.

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Authority AWD745005

By MJD NARA Date 5/16/11

MISSION NO. 29
 DATE 10 FEB. 1945
 WING XXI. B.C.
 GROUP AIR SEA RESCUE



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 By MJD NARA Date 5/16/11

S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

WEATHER

Mission No. 29

10 February 1945

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Authority: MMD745005

By: mjd NARA Date: 5/16/11

S E C R E T